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RECENT DECISIONS
merely because his action arose separately. In the latter instance, the
individual is compelled to pay his judgment and rely upon the un-
certainties and delays of diplomatic negotiations to afford him relief.
As was stated initially, the rule of foreign immunity evolved en-
tirely from judicial opinion, and therefore may be altered as the Su-
preme Court deems it necessary. The question remains, however,
whether it is proper for the Court to exercise this power. Much of
Chief Justice Marshall's reasoning is valid today and care should be
taken so as not to injure friendly relations with foreign governments.
It is not intended to imply, however, that the rule should remain
unaltered. What was deemed good 134 years ago might well be
detrimental today. Rather, it is submitted that the legislative and
executive branches of the Government, being in a better position to
evaluate the effect of such changes, should re-appraise the entire con-
cept of foreign sovereign immunity. This method would give foreign
governments notice of any change in policy. The instant case might
well prove to be the impetus needed to stimulate such re-appraisal
of the rule.
SALEs - BREACH OF WARRANTY - SUPPLYING OF BLOOD BY
HOSPITAL NOT A SALE.-The plaintiff, a patient at defendant hospital,
was given a blood transfusion by a physician. The blood, supplied to
the plaintiff by the hospital for $60, contained jaundice viruses and,
as a result, the plaintiff developed homologous serum hepatitis. An
action was commenced for breach of implied warranty.1 The defen-
dant moved to dismiss the complaint for insufficiency, but the Special
Term denied the motion and the Appellate Division unanimously
affirmed. The Court of Appeals, in reversing,2 held that the supplying
of blood for a price by a hospital is not a sale but merely an incident
of an entire contract for services to which implied warranties do not
attach. Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d
792 (1954).
In order for there to be an implied warranty under Section 96
of the Sales Act, there must be a contract of sale.3 However, when
I "Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller
the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears that
the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment . . . . there is an implied
warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose." N.Y. PENs.
PROP. LAW § 96(1). "Where the goods are bought by description from a seller
who deals in goods of that description .... there is an implied warranty that
the goods shall be of merchantable quality." Id. § 96 (2).2 In a four-three decision, Conway, Dye and Froessel, J.J., dissented.
3 Haag v. Klee, 162 Misc. 250, 293 N.Y. Supp. 266 (Sup. Ct. 1936); see
WHITNEY, LAW OF SALES § 145 (4th ed. 1947).
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the rendition of a service includes a transfer of property, a difficult
question arises as to whether the transaction is a sale or a service.
In certain instances, the question has been answered with some cer-
tainty in New York. For example, when the applicability of the
Statute of Frauds is in issue, the test to be applied in determining
whether the contract is for services or sale is clearly set out in Section
85 of the Personal Property Law.4  Contrary to the rule before the
enactment of the Uniform Sales Act,5 a contract for the transfer of
goods not yet in existence now constitutes a sale.0 However, if the
goods ". . . manufactured ... for the buyer ... are not suitable for
sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller's business .... 7
the transaction is regarded as a contract for services.8
In actions for breach of implied warranty under Section 96, there
is no comparable statutory test. Furthermore, the cases that have
dealt with the problem have not spelled out suitable criteria to aid
the lawyer in distinguishing a sale from a service. For example, in
Temple v. Keeler,9 a patron sued a restaurant for breach of warranty
of the food it served. The court, although recognizing the service
aspect of the transaction, eluded the problem and simply held it to be
a "qualified sale." In Miller v. Winters,'° the court allowed the de-
fendant's counterclaim for breach of implied warranty of an entire
heating system installed by the plaintiff. In so deciding, the court
implied the warranty, though admitting the importance of the service
aspect." Thus, until the instant case, the question was relatively
unanswered in New York. In other jurisdictions, the problem has
been squarely met most often in the "restaurant cases." A predomi-
nance test was applied and the transaction was held to be mainly one
for services rather than for a sale of goods.1
2
In the instant case, the Court faced the problem squarely and,
endeavoring to discover the essence of the contract, applied the test
of predominance. The Court, in citing its authority, resorted mainly
4N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 85(2), Indiana Limestone Co. v. Harry Bernstein
Cut Stone Co., 263 App. Div. 312, 32 N.Y.S.2d 956 (1st Dep't 1942).
5If the goods were not substantially in existence at the time of the making
of the contract, the agreement was one for work, labor and services, and not
for the sale of goods. Parsons v. Loucks, 48 N.Y. 17 (1871) ; see Cooke v.
Millard, 65 N.Y. 352, 359 (1875).
6 See note 4 supra.
7 N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 85 (2).
8 See Gura v. Herman, 227 App. Div. 452, 238 N.Y. Supp. 230 (2d Dep't
1929), aff'd inem., 253 N.Y. 618, 171 N.E. 808 (1930); Indiana Limestone Co.
v. Harry Bernstein Cut Stone Co., supra note 4.
9 238 N.Y. 344, 144 N.E. 635 (1924).
10 144 N.Y. Supp. 351 (Sup. Ct. 1913).
11 Id. at 354.
12 See, e.g., Loucks v. Morley, 39 Cal. App. 570, 179 Pac. 529 (1919) ; Merrill
v. Hodson, 88 Conn. 314, 91 Atl. 533 (1914); Nisky v. Childs Co., 103 N.J.L.
464, 135 Atl. 805 (1927) ; see Kenney v. Wong Len, 81 N.H. 427, 128 Ati. 343,
348 (1925).
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to cases from foreign jurisdictions. It cited only one New York
case,13 not involving a breach of warranty, in which the court held,
per curiam, that a contract to paint pictures is one for work, labor
and services, and not within the purview of Section 82 of the Sales
Act.14 As the action in that case was not for breach of implied war-
ranty, so the other cases cited by the Court may be likewise distin-
guished. One involved the applicability of an occupational tax,' 5
another the applicability of a zoning ordinance, 16 a third was an action
to recover the balance due upon a contract,' 7 while the last was a
replevin action.' 8 These cases may be distinguished further on the
ground that the property transferred was directly worked upon by the
transferor in accomplishing the purpose of the contract.' In the in-
stant case, the transfer of the blood was unattended by any acts of
ministration by the hospital. The act of transfusing blood, on the
other hand, was a medical act performed by a physician, for which
the hospital is not legally answerable.20 There were merely many
various peripheral acts of service generally relatable to the transfer
of blood in the form of prior and subsequent treatment of the patient. 21
13 Racklin-Fagin Constr. Corp. v. Villar, 156 Misc. 220, 281 N.Y. Supp. 426
(App. T. 1st Dep't 1935).
14 "1. A contract to sell goods is a contract whereby the seller agrees to
transfer the property in goods to the buyer for a consideration called the price.
"2. A sale of goods is an agreement whereby the seller transfers the prop-
erty in goods to the buyer for a consideration called the price." N.Y. PERS.
PROP. LAW § 82.
15 See Babcock v. Nudelman, 367 Ill. 626, 12 N.E.2d 635 (1937). The
plaintiff-optometrist sought to enjoin the Director of Finance from enforcing
the tax against him. The tax was directed against individuals engaged in the
business of selling personalty. The court held that the supplying of lenses was
incidental to the plaintiff's profession and that therefore he was not subject to
the tax. The court did not hold it was not a sale.
16 See Town of Saugus v. B. Perini & Sons, Inc., 305 Mass. 403, 26 N.E.2d
1, 3 (1940). The town sought to enjoin the defendant from removing gravel
from a pit, allegedly in violation of a zoning ordinance prohibiting such re-
moval for purposes of sale. The defendant was removing the gravel pursuant
to a contract for road construction. The court held that the ordinance was
not applicable since the contract was not one of sale but for labor and services.
17 See Sidney Stevens Implement Co. v. Hintze, 92 Utah 264, 67 P.2d 632
(1937). The plaintiff agreed to build an automobile trailer for the defendant.
Upon defendant's default, the plaintiff sued to recover the balance of the agreed
price. The court held that the contract was one for work, labor and services,
and not one of sale.
is See Crystal Recreation, Inc. v. Seattle Ass'n of Credit Men, 34 Wash.2d
553, 209 P.2d 358 (1949). An agreement called for a contractor to manufac-
ture fixtures for the plaintiff. The contractor later made an assignment for
the benefit of creditors. Defendant, who was a creditor, took possession of
some of the fixtures. The court upheld plaintiff's replevin action holding the
contract to be for work, labor and services, title passing to plaintiff prior to
assignment.
19 See notes 13, 15-18 supra.20 See Necolayff v. Genesee Hosp., 270 App. Div. 648, 652-653, 61 N.Y.S.2d
832, 836 (4th Dep't 1946), aff'd mere., 296 N.Y. 936, 73 N.E.2d 117 (1947).
21 "The supplying of blood by the hospital was entirely subordinate to its
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Prior to the instant case, the traditional liability of a hospital to
its patients was in the area of tort. In New York, relying upon the
doctrine of respondeat superior,22 a hospital has been held liable to
its patients for the negligence of its servants, doctors and nurses when
engaged in administrative acts.23  However, where the act is a med-
ical one, the negligent conduct of a doctor, nurse or employee will not
be imputed to the hospital.24  It is the nature of the act that deter-
mines the hospital's liability.2 5 The instant case is illustrative of a
few pioneer attempts to attach liability upon a hospital on a theory
other than negligence. Similar actions have been brought in Ohio 26
and Kentucky.27  In those jurisdictions, however, the action was de-
feated upon the ground that it was really tortious in nature and the
prevailing policy would not permit a further extension of the tort
liability of hospitals.28
In the instant case, the Court felt that liability without fault
should not be imposed upon the institution.., actually seeking
to save ... the patient." 29 Thus, the patient is referred to the often
difficult task of proving negligence. The ability of an anesthetized
paramount function of furnishing trained personnel and specialized facilities
in an endeavor to restore plaintiff's health. It was not . . . blood . . . for
which plaintiff bargained, but the wherewithal of the hospital staff and the
availability of hospital facilities...." Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308
N.Y. 100, 106, 123 N.E.2d 792, 795 (1954).
22 This is the oldest theory upon which the liability of charitable hospitals
to their patients is predicated. See Grunfeld, Recent Developments In the
Hospital Cases, 17 MoD. L. REv. 547, 549-550 (1954).2 3 Ranelli v. New York Hosp., 295 N.Y. 850, 67 N.E.2d 257 (1946) (nurse);
Dillon v. Rockaway Beach Hosp., 284 N.Y. 176, 30 N.E.2d 373 (1940)
(servant); see Greenberg v. Hillside Hosp., 73 N.Y.S.2d 21, 22 (Sup. Ct. 1947)
(doctor and nurse).
24Phillips v. Buffalo General Hosp., 239 N.Y. 188, 146 N.E. 199 (1924)
(servant); Schloendorff v. New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914)
(doctor); Morse v. Syracuse Merm Hosp., 83 N.Y.S.2d 830 (Sup. Ct. 1948)
(nurse).
25 Phillips v. Buffalo General Hosp., supra note 24; Jones v. City of New
York Hosp., 134 N.Y.S.2d 779, 781 (Sup. Ct. 1954) ; see Bobb6, Tort Liability
of Hospitals in New York, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 419, 432-435 (1952); Note, 25
N.Y.U.L.Q. Rav. 612, 618 (1950).
26 Cf. Lovich v. Salvation Army, Inc., 81 Ohio App. 317, 75 N.E.2d 459
(1947). This was a suit for breach of implied warranty of food served by
defendant-charitable institution to plaintiff-resident.
27 See Forrest v. Red Cross Hosp., Inc., 265 S.W.2d 80 (Ky. 1954). The
action was for breach of implied warranty of food served to a paying patient
by the hospital.
28 "... [Wihether the liability is based upon a breach of implied warranty
or negligence, . . . the result is the same. The action . . . is tortious in nature
and the rule of limited liability in favor of eleemosynary or charitable insti-
tutions must be applied." Lovich v. Salvation Army, Inc., sapra note 26,
75 N.E.2d at 464. See Forrest v. Red Cross Hosp., Inc., sapra note 27,
265 S.W.2d at 82.
29 Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 107, 123 N.E.2d 792, 795
(1954).
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individual to bear witness to negligent conduct is, of course, limited.
One troubled by serious afflictions of the body is seldom able to per-
ceive a negligent act or omission. This results in an inability not
only to adduce affirmative evidence by the plaintiff, but to rebut the
testimony of adverse witnesses. However, even if the plaintiff sur-
mounts these barriers and negligence is proven, a final stumbling block
lies in the nature of the acts or omissions. If they be adjudged to be
medical, whether there be negligence or not, the plaintiff has no rem-
edy against the hospital. 30 The effect of the instant case is to limit
patients to their difficult task of establishing negligence. This is con-
trary to the current trend of widening the bounds of hospital liability.3'
Actions for breach of implied warranty are tortious in nature and
have their common-law foundation in actions for deceit. 2 "The basis
of implied warranty is justifiable reliance on the judgment or skill of
the warrantor... ." ,3 According to Section 96, a warranty of fitness
for use attaches to goods sold provided that the buyer makes known
to the seller the purpose for which the goods are required and
"... relies on the seller's skill or judgment. .... ,, 34 However, "[i] f
the buyer has examined the goods, there is no implied warranty as
regards defects which such examination ought to have revealed." 3
It would appear, therefore, that the basis of the cause of action was
not materially changed. The declaration by the legislature that a
warranty, is implied in the sale of goods did not serve to make the fact
of sale an inflexible element in the gravamen of the complaint, but
merely a circumstance which permits an action to be maintained.
Recognizing the tort history of warranty and the true nature of the
action, it does not seem proper to subject the essential condition of a
sale to the same rigid scrutiny as it must undergo in other actions,
purely ex contractu.
It does not seem that an opposite conclusion by the Court would
have resulted in imposing a serious burden upon the hospital. If a
recovery were had, then, as the dissent indicated, the hospital would
have a right of indemnity over against a third party. Nor does it
seem that the possibility of ultimate personal liability would result,
in the case of blood, in any general public refusal to sell blood. The
instances in which diseased blood reaches the patient would be few.
Furthermore, in these cases, the ends of justice would be best served
by imposition of liability since, in the case of jaundice, whether or
30 See notes 24 and 25 supra.
3 1 See Ranelli v. New York Hosp., 49 N.Y.S.2d 898, 901 (Sup. Ct. 1944),
modified, 269 App. Div. 906, 56 N.Y.S.2d 481 (2d Dep't 1945), aff'd mere., 295
N.Y. 850, 67 N.E.2d 257 (1946); see BobbY, Tort Liability of Hospitals in
New York, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 419, 437 (1952); 38 COL. L. REv. 1485, 1489
(1938).
32 See Ames, The History of Assampsit, 2 HARv. L. REV. 1, 8 (1888).
33 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 242b (Rev. ed. 1948).34 N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §96(1).35 Id. § 96(3).
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not the blood reaches a patient depends upon the integrity of the paid
donor 36 in most instances.8 7
Now that the test of predominance has been formulated, trans-
actions which embrace both services and a transfer of property are
required to be viewed in their entirety. This is true even though the
transfer aspect is clearly distinguished by a separate consideration.
Such a transfer may in itself involve no elements of service; however,
because the general relationship between the contracting parties is one
for services, the transfer is deprived of its standing as a sale. Al-
though there be a predominance of services in such cases, this should
not, in justice, preclude a breach of warranty action since the goods
are transferred for a price, distinct from that offered for the services.
The purpose of implied warranty is to afford protection to the
buyer. It is an answer of natural justice to the doctrine of caveat
emptor.88  It is submitted, therefore, that Section 82 be amended to
include transactions in which, though the predominant aspect be ser-
vice, there is a transfer of property for a separate consideration.
A
TORTS-LAcK OF SUPERVISION AS GROUND FOR DENYING Hos-
PITAL ImMUNiTY.-Plaintiff brought suit against defendant hospital
for the wrongful death of his child. The decedent, a baby several
hours old, had been placed in a bassinet and warmed by an electric
lamp I in the hospital nursery. A student nurse, supervisor of the
nursery, moved the lamp close to the child and left the ward to attend
to administrative duties, returning twenty minutes later to find the
bassinet enveloped in flames. The Court, holding that the hospital was
36 Homologous serum jaundice ". . . is produced by the parenteral inocu-
lation of whole blood, serum or plasma, ordinarily obtained from an individual
who is supposedly nonjaundiced, or at least from a donor not known (at the
time) to be ill with infectious hepatitis." Paul, Havens, Sabin, and Philip,
Transmission Experiments in Serum Jaundice and Infectious Hepatitis, 128
J.A.M.A. 911 (1945). The incubation period for infectious hepatitis is from
10-40 days. This period is followed by severe reactions. See GREENBERG AND
MArZ, MODERN CONCEPTs OF CommUNIcAmz DisEAsE 183-184 (1953). Thus,
one usually should be aware of such an affliction and, upon being asked at the
time of giving the blood (which is the usual practice), should volunteer such
information.
37 There may be occasions when a person may sell his blood during the
rather short incubation period of infectious hepatitis.38 See Howard Iron Works v. Buffalo Elevating Co., 113 App. Div. 562,
570, 99 N.Y. Supp. 163, 167 (4th Dep't 1906), aff'd inem., 188 N.Y. 619, 81
N.E. 1166 (1907).
'The use of a light bulb to warm infants is said to be normal hospital
practice. See Cadicamo v. Long Island College Hosp., 308 N.Y. 196, 199, 124
N.E.2d 279 (1954).
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